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Abstract 
 
Stereotypes pose a major challenge to agents entering a foreign market. In order to 
overcome these stereotypes, visitor agents may decide to emulate domestic behavior. 
We develop a simple model of reputation building in transactions where identities are 
revealed and show that this tendency may even imply over-assimilation if stereotypes 
are sticky and assimilation efforts are not overly costly.  
The model predictions are tested using data on private equity-led buyout transactions 
in Japan from 1998 to 2015. While early transactions by Anglo-Saxon investors 
display marked differences, there is a strong tendency toward approximation of 
domestic standards, which eventually leads to over-compensation.  
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1. Introduction: The “visitors to Rome” effect 
Si fueris Romae, Romano vivito more. When in Rome, do as the Romans do.  
(attributed to Ambrosius Aurelius, 3rd century CE)  
 
Social norms are intimately linked to preferences (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2006; Gibson, 
Tanner, and Wagner 2013). As the former differ across cultures and as the latter matter for 
economic behavior, culture-specific differences in economic outcomes are to be expected. Indeed, 
significant differences have variously been evidenced in, for instance, public goods experiments 
(Willinger et al. 2003), a study of solidarity experiments (Ockenfels and Weimann 1999) and 
empirical investigations of entrepreneurial activity (Hayton, George, and Zahra 2002).  
When agents with systematically differing preferences meet to engage in transactions, a 
further class of phenomena arises. These have been referred to, among others, as homophily (the 
tendency of agents to associate with similar others; see Kandel 1978; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 
and Cook 2001), in-group bias (the tendency to evaluate one's own group or its members more 
favorably; see Ruffle and Sosis 2006; Chen and Li 2009), and simply stereotypes (the association 
of out-group agents with a collective reputation; Coate and Loury 1993). In essence, these 
framings all involve making trivial judgments about groups of individuals in an effort to 
compensate for incomplete information.  
Judgments of this kind referring to the preferences of out-group agents are significant for 
economic interaction. For instance, public goods experiments find that contributions are higher in 
culturally homogeneous groups (Castro 2008), and may depend on physical attractiveness 
(Andreoni and Petrie 2008) or gender (Solow and Kirkwood 2002). In turn, evidence from field 
data frequently refers to ethnicity (e.g., employers judging the productivity of applicants as in 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), and also extends to financial topics, for example when pension 
fund investments depend on (foreign-sounding) names of fund managers (Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, 
and Spalt 2015). 
Agents who are starting to compete in a foreign market therefore face a double challenge. 
First, they hail from a culturally different background where different norms prevail, so they need 
to learn to adapt to local norms. Second, they are likely to be subject to stereotyping. To 
paraphrase Akerlof and Kranton (2000:737), visitors who make what domestic agents regard as 
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“bad decisions” may want to use strategically revealed preferences to signal a change of identity. 
Accordingly, one can expect that rational agents entering foreign markets will tend to emulate 
domestic behavior in an attempt at reputation building.  
(Qualitative) evidence on what we may term the “visitors to Rome” effect has been 
variously gathered in the business literature. For instance, there is an entire canon of literature on 
cultural dynamics pertaining to market entry (e.g., Rothaermel, Kotha, and Steensma 2006), 
localization (Fayol-Song 2011), post-merger integration (Vaara 2012), and various other 
phenomena (Park and Ungson 1997, Sarala and Vaara 2010). Within economics, however, the 
phenomenon has not yet been analytically framed, nor empirically tested. 
 
This paper aims to fill this gap by proposing and testing a model for the “visitors to Rome” effect. 
The model is constructed with reference to extant literature on labor market discrimination and 
identity, then tested using a data set on private equity buyout investments conducted in Japan by 
domestic and visiting agents (chiefly of Anglo-Saxon origin) between 1998 and 2015. The choice 
of the empirical case is promising for two reasons. First, the likelihood of being able to discern 
significant effects increases with the degree of heterogeneity between visitor and native agents, 
which is arguably at its maximum among advanced economies in interactions between Anglo-
Saxon and Japanese agents. Second, private equity transactions feature a number of characteristics 
supportive of the “visitors to Rome” effect, such as the “direct personal relations” between 
suppliers and demanders (Arrow 1998: 94), with the substantial extent of personal interaction 
during the purchasing process creating a “social event” (ibid: 98).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we combine elements of 
reputation-building models with game-theoretic argument to arrive at an analytical representation 
of the “visitors to Rome” effect, which we then use to develop a set of generic predictions. Section 
3 tests model predictions for the case of Anglo-Saxon private equity investors in Japan. Section 4 
discusses findings and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Model 
Our model of the “visitors to Rome” effect distinguishes visitor (foreign) from domestic (native) 
agents. Visitors v and domestic players d are competing for purchase transactions from local 
sellers, thus engaging in a series of one-shot games with revealed identities as in Healy's model of 
labor market reputation building (2007). The utility of local sellers U depends on bid price p and 
reputation r of the acquirer in a quasi-linear utility function.  
(1) U = p + rk ,   k  [0,1]. 
 
Visitors depart on their journey with an expectation of higher profits with the expected difference 
determining their travel budget B > 0.  This budget may be used to compensate for a negative 
reputation differential by paying a premium. However, investors will only provide capital for bids 
until risk-adjusted expected returns are on a par with opportunity cost in terms of returns they 
could earn in their reference market. Thus, the maximum premium over domestic bid prices is:  
(2)  
 
We further assume a market structure where the chances of repeat transactions of a particular 
native seller with a particular visitor are approximately zero, preventing private reputation 
building through experimentation (in terms of individual track records with specific counterparts). 
Accordingly, we argue that reputation is informed by the following two factors: stereotype S 
pertaining to the country of origin; and individual reputation rI. Arguing with Arrow that “prior 
beliefs can remain relatively undisturbed” (1998:97), we employ “sticky stereotypes” by keeping 
S constant. As stereotypes obviously require a domestic numéraire for reference, domestic 
reputation rd only depends on individual reputation. For reasons of simplicity, we set the latter 
constant at r*. Thus we have: 
(3) rv =  , α  [0,1].  
 . 
Substituting p and r in (1) with (2) and (3) yields: 
 (4) 
€ 
U = pi + αS + 1−α( )riI[ ]
k
   for i ∈ v. 
     = pi + r*k   for i ∈ d. 
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Other than by paying a premium, negatively stereotyped visitors can increase their odds of 
winning a transaction through assimilation efforts e aimed at increasing their individual reputation rI. 
These efforts can be seen as strategically revealed preferences taking the form of conscious and 
costly deviations from original preferences. With the average of original visitor preferences OP 
corresponding to their stereotype S, displaying revealed preferences RP beyond their original pre-
ferences requires effort: 
(5)  rI = RP = OP + e = S + e 
 
As is apparent from (5), the individual reputation of visitors is no different from their stereotypes 
in the absence of effort. Thus, if visitor bids are turned down in favor of a lower domestic bid, i.e. in 
spite of pv > pd, this may only happen in the presence of negative stereotypes, i.e., S < r*. 
Inversely, visitors are subject to positive stereotypes if they happen to win a contract in spite of 
higher bids from domestic players, i.e., S > r*. Similar to Becker’s classical model (1957), our 
model includes the notion of disutility d = – (r* – S)k  as arising from the tastes of domestic agents. 
 
 Efforts compensating for negative stereotypes are obviously costly. This corresponds to the 
net “lower economic returns” that Akerlof and Kranton suggest for activities that do not 
correspond to an agent’s minority group identity (2000: 740). We posit that the opposite holds for 
positive stereotypes (foreign origin perceived as linked to more virtuous behavior from a domestic 
perspective). In that case, approximating domestic preferences corresponds to negative efforts 
implying negative cost, i.e., benefits. We note this as:  
(6) C(e) = c(RP – OP), with c  [0,1]. 
 
To maximize their odds of winning a transaction, bidders need to maximize the utility of 
sellers given their own budget constraints. We specify the target function for an n-period case, in 
which efforts made at time t lead to a better reputation in t + 1, i.e., rIv,t = S + et-1. As no efforts 
can be made prior to market entry, i.e., et=0 = 0, initial reputation rIv,t=1  equals stereotype S. In turn, 
with no reputation benefits accruing from effort in the final period, a reversion to original 
preferences is to be expected in the last period, i.e., et=n = 0. From the domestic agents’ 
perspective this reversion is likely to be perceived as “shirking”. As both profits and reputation 
building critically depend on striking a deal, we further add a sustainability condition demanding 
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equal seller utility in all periods, i.e., U1,2, …, n = constant. Substituting rI  in (4) with (5) we obtain:  
 (7) 
€ 
max Ut
t
n
∑ = pv;t + S + 1−α( )et−1[ ]
k{ }
t
n
∑  
         
        
€ 
+µ1,2,...,n pv;1 + Sk − pv;2,3,...,n − S + 1−α( )e1,2,....,n−1[ ]
k{ } 
 
Solving (7) provides optimality conditions for the n-period case:  
(8)  
ên  = 0 
  =  
 
 
From the differences in bid prices between the initial and subsequent periods we further obtain the 
additional utility that sellers derive from earlier efforts in terms of total utility from reputation less 
the part resulting from stereotype S: 
 (9)  
 
Over-compensation through efforts larger than the differential between domestic reputation r* and 
stereotype S corresponds to the inequality e > r* – S. Substituting e with its optimality condition (8) 
and solving for r* we obtain: 
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(10)   
 
From this, we understand that over-compensation becomes more likely with increasing k (as the 
importance attached to reputation). In contrast, the likelihood of over-compensation becomes 
smaller with cost c of assimilation efforts and with increasing α as the weight attributed to 
stereotype in determining reputation (see Appendix A.1 for partial derivatives).  
For visitors to succeed in their bids, seller utility derived from visitor offers needs to be 
larger than that linked to offers from natives: 
(11)  
 
Substituting pv and pn in (11) with the side condition of (7) and the optimum condition for e in (8) 
via (3) and (5) and solving for B gives the travel budget required to strike a deal: 
(12)  
 
While the required level of B increases with the cost of reaching a certain reputation level (less the 
fraction derived from S), it decreases with the total benefits of reputation. The higher – or, 
normatively, the more positive – the value of S, the less budget is required for striking a deal.  
 
All of the preceding only holds under the assumption of complete information. If, however, 
agents are unaware of the relevance of reputation, i.e., of k > 0 at time t = 1, they will act 
according to their original preferences. This, in turn, means emulating their stereotypical behavior 
during early transactions, effectively reducing (12) to a much simpler budget under incomplete 
information as BII > r*k – Sk, where BII needs to provide for compensating reputational deficiencies 
entirely by paying a premium. 
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Learning 
Hayek held that markets are learning processes where “individual participants [are] gradually 
learning the relevant circumstances” (1948:100). Starting from a state of relative ignorance, 
entering a learning trajectory is not to be taken for granted: if visitor budgets are sufficient to 
compensate for their still unknown reputation gap by offering a premium price, i.e., if 
 holds, agents may continue to unconsciously follow an inefficient strategy. Thus, 
for the market to encourage Hayekian learning in our model, BHL needs to satisfy: 
(13) BHL < r*k – Sk 
 
There are plenty of “relevant circumstances” initially unknown to the visitors in our model: the 
very existence and extent of stereotype S and its weight α in determining reputation, as well as the 
possibility of reputation building through effort. The domestic numéraire r* and its difference 
from original preferences OP – r* may also not be known; ignorance may even apply to the sign 
of that difference. In contrast, group sizes v and d of visitors and domestic players are known in 
transactions with revealed identities. A larger group of visitors helps to identify systematic 
differences in success rates as the number of observations increases.  
 
Learning curves have traditionally been conceptualized as unit cost of production declining 
with accumulated production volume, which suggests an inverse square root function (Spence 
1981; Saviotti and Metcalfe 1984). Turning this reasoning around, we suggest that knowledge 
vector κ of visitor i pertaining to relevant circumstance j is subject to a learning process with κi,j ∈ 
[0;1] where 1 represents complete information and all other states fractions thereof. Vector 
loadings are informed by the number τ of transactions observed since market entry. We have 
suggested that visitors face a double challenge as they need to learn about both the preferences of 
domestic sellers and the extent of stereotyping. Whereas visitors may infer the importance 
attached to reputation k by domestic sellers from all market transactions τm, the extent of 
stereotyping α can only be inferred from transactions involving peers τp (compare equation 4). 
Accordingly, as in Ghemawat and Spence (1985), the number of fellow visitors v, and more 
exactly the visitor share of the agent population v/(d+v) and the resulting share of transactions 
won by visitors, positively contributes to learning speed. Relating the learning of visitors directly 
to transactions as in itself the “teaching material” rather than indirectly only via the likelihood of 
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transactions won by visitors, the function informing vector κ is:  
(14) κ i,j = β1τo,mϕ + β2τo,pϕ , with 0 < ϕ < 1. 
 
In light of (4), β-parameters thus reflect learning about the relevance of reputation k in the utility 
function of sellers as drawn from observing all market transactions (β1 ), and to the extent of 
stereotyping (β2 ) as drawn from the observation of peer transactions. With  and , 
this representation also incorporates the decreasing marginal knowledge returns on learning. 
As τ accumulates over time, we may expect visitors to experience an iteration process 
characterized by |eτ=0| < |ê| and eτ → ê as τ → ∞. Absolute values of e are noted here in order to 
account for cases of positive visitor stereotyping, in which visitors gradually learn to bank on their 
stereotypes, realizing cost savings from relaxing their efforts.  
Extensions 
In our simple model, the effect of efforts is limited to the subsequent period, which opens up the 
opportunity of a fresh start at the very same optimum conditions (8). However, it would be more 
realistic to assume that the reputation of visitors accrues from the history of their efforts, i.e., the 
sum of differentials between revealed and mean original preferences.  
(15)  
 
As a consequence, the marginal effect of efforts on reputation declines with each own transaction, 
i.e., < 0. Depending on a visitor’s budget, this may have two different consequences. First, 
visitors with Hayekian budgets according to (13) may find their learning speed outpaced by the 
increase in cost of optimum effort, which will cause them to abandon their journey. Second, 
visitors with budgets sufficient for continuously compensating negative stereotypes through 
premium prices, i.e., , may find themselves already in a lock-in situation when they 
eventually happen to learn through spillovers. Thus, the marginal cost of reputation building from 
a given level of reputation  monotonously increases over time, i.e., Ct (rv,t⏐rv,t-1) > 0. 
While the learning process is still ongoing, i.e.,⏐κ⏐ < 1, the absolute values of visitors’ 
efforts are systematically biased down and those of bid prices are biased up as compared to 
outcomes in a state of complete information ⏐κ⏐ = 1 eventually to be reached with transaction t*. 
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Here, the quasi-linear utility function of sellers enables four types of outcome to be inferred. 
Given finite time horizons, it may become impossible to reach optimum allocation when marginal 
reputation benefits from effort reach below par with marginal utility from prices offered, i.e.,  
Ue ⏐rv,t-1 < Up = 1. Depending on visitor budgets, this may cause either lock-in or exit. Figure I 
summarizes these considerations. 
 
Figure I: Convergence of Visitor Behavior  
 B > BHL B ≤ BHL 
Ue ⏐rv,t-1 < 1  for t ≤ t* Lock-in Exit 
Ue ⏐rv,t-1 ≥ 1 for t ≤ t* Optimum Optimum 
 
 
A further refinement to the model would imply the introduction of a decay function describing 
how the weight attached to an instance of revealed preferences in the formation of reputation 
decreases with time as in Carlson and Rowe (1976) or similar models involving “forgetting” (e.g., 
Jaber and Bonney 1997). Obviously, the “forgetting” property alleviates the increase in marginal 
cost of reputation building implied by (15) and will cause t* to increase.  
 
Finally, if domestic players perceive the ratio of visitor to domestic agents v/d as 
substantial, visitor behavior may cause domestic reputation to become endogenous. This is 
because domestic agents may start to also deviate from their original preferences in a strategic 
move to fight off what they perceive as increasing competition from visitors. This tendency will 
be particularly strong if domestic players are not aware of the stereotyping that visitors are subject 
to. In that case decisions of domestic players are guided by superior visitor bid prices pv > pd and 
visitor efforts in terms of revealed preferences approaching, or even exceeding, their own 
standards, i.e., e > r*. As visitors, in turn, will rightly perceive this type of strategic move by 
domestic players as an attempt to build reputation, i.e., en = RPn – r* > 0, this may effectively 
elevate the equilibrium level of revealed preferences in terms of virtuous behavior as judged from 
the perspective of domestic sellers (and vice versa in case of positive stereotypes).  
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Predictions 
To begin with, let us consider visitors competing with domestic agents for a transaction at time 0.  
Due to the earlier absence of activity, individual reputation is nil at time 0. Given uniform 
maximum bid prices, an inverse reading of equation (4) thus suggests: 
Prediction 0: In the presence of stereotypes the initial market success of visitors is 
markedly different from that of domestic competitors at equal bid prices. 
While agents entering a foreign market as visitors may have some notions of the cultural 
differences linked to their country of origin, it is through the observation of market outcomes that 
they learn the effect of these differences on their success rates from participation in and 
observation of transactions with natives.  Differences may take either sign according to whether 
they result from positive or negative stereotyping.  Given uniform alternative returns, equation (8) 
implies that these differences create incentives to either compensate for stereotype or to bank on it: 
success rates higher than domestic ones imply an incentive for less virtuous behavior (from a 
domestic perspective), while lower success rates encourage more effort. This suggests: 
Prediction 1: Visitors show a tendency to mimic domestic behavior. 
 
If – in line with the conjecture about taste-based discrimination resulting from dependence on the 
taste of other stakeholders – stereotypes are effectively sticky, and if assimilation efforts are not 
overly costly, i.e., as long as marginal benefits are larger than marginal cost Ue > Ce, equation (10) 
means that attempts at improving success rates may even imply over-compensation. The latter 
becomes more likely if visitors start their journey with incomplete information. This is because 
early – ill-informed – visitor behavior may eventually produce statistical evidence to reinforce 
existing stereotypes as reputation accrues through the history of their transactions. 
 
Where sizeable numbers of visitors eventually improve their success rates through 
reputation building, leading to them winning a substantial number of deals, i.e., τv/τd >> 0, the 
market outcomes of domestic agents will not remain unaffected. This, in turn, creates incentives 
for natives to reinforce their original reputational positioning (as behaving more virtuously than 
foreigners, or vice versa) elevating (negative stereotype), or lowering the equilibrium level of 
revealed preferences (positive stereotype): 
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Prediction 2: Where the ratio of transactions won by visitors relative to domestic agents is 
perceived as significant, domestic agents will show a tendency to reinforce 
their original reputational positioning. 
 
Building on (4) we understand that visitors may infer the relevance k attached to reputation by 
domestic sellers through observation of all market transactions τm. However, the extent of 
stereotype S and the weight α attached to stereotype in forming reputation can only be inferred 
from peer transactions τp. This suggests 
Prediction 3: Learning from fellow visitors leads to faster assimilation than learning from 
natives. 
Finally, we expect visitors to defect in their ultimate transaction before withdrawing from the 
market, analogous to non-infinite games, i.e., ên = 0 as noted in (8): 
Prediction 4: Behavior in ultimate transactions corresponds to original preferences. 
 
 
3. Empirical tests 
There are broadly two ways of testing the model proposed here: experimental designs and field 
data. Experimental study is generally praised for its reliability based on its capacity to minimize 
bias from unobserved variables. Critics, however, question the validity of experiments on the 
grounds that reality is insufficiently represented in laboratory settings (Collier and Siebert 1991; 
Harrison, List, and Towe 2007). This conceptual critique certainly applies to the challenge of 
constructing groups with significant “otherness” characteristics as displayed by visitors and 
domestic agents in our model. In turn, field data, by its very definition, defies any criticism of 
insufficient representation of reality. Criticism of the use of field data rather refers to its reliability, 
particularly so for cross-cultural comparisons where unobserved variables may turn findings 
upside down (Blind and Lottanti von Mandach 2015).  
For the specific purpose of testing the “visitors to Rome” effect, however, much of this 
latter issue is canceled out. This is because interaction between foreign and domestic agents 
happens in a single market embedded in a homogeneous cultural and institutional environment. 
Against that background, we argue that field data represents the better option for testing the 
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“visitors to Rome” effect as it scores high on validity and minimizes threats to reliability. 
 
Measuring the interaction effects of cultural differences on economic outcomes from field 
data poses two challenges. First, culture has to be operationalized and measured in order to study 
its impact. Second, inferences from observed behavior are challenging because of the reflection 
problem (Manski 1993; 2000). Attempts to face the first challenge date back to the mid-20th 
century (Kuhn and McPartland 1954; Kluchhohn and Strodtbeck 1961; Haire, Ghiselli, and Porter 
1966; England 1967; Rokeach 1973), but it was with Hofstede (1980; 2001) that the interest in 
measuring culture exploded. Although it is only one of 121 instruments identified in a recent 
review of attempts to measure culture (Taras, Rowney, and Steel 2009) and is not undisputed (see, 
e.g., McSweeney 2002; Ailon 2008 and 2009), it remains by far the most pertinent approach, not 
least because operationalization is straightforward. Furthermore, drawing on probabilistic 
argument, one may argue that differences in cultural dimensions are reasonably well represented 
for very large distances in Hofstede’s indices. Manski’s reflection problem, in turn, only arises if 
group composition is not known a priori. In our field data, the revealed identities of agents 
involved in buyout transactions implies that this criterion is met. 
Case background 
To test our predictions we use a unique dataset covering the population of buyout investments 
conducted by all private equity funds registered in Japan between 1998, the year known as the 
onset of the Japanese buyout industry (Wright, Kitamura, and Hoskisson 2003), and September 
2015. The choice of the empirical case comes with two major advantages. First, differences in 
initial values (i.e., original preferences of Japanese and Anglo-Saxon agents) are very likely to be 
substantial enough to enable assimilation effects to be discerned. Second, revealed identities, 
together with the personal interactions that come with private equity transactions, creates a setting 
in which taste-based discrimination may effectively play out. The dataset, assembled and cross-
evaluated using government reports, fund websites, press searches and data provided by an 
independent Japanese advisor, includes 545 buyout transactions.  
A buyout transaction is usually a one-off investment by a general partner (GP), the fund 
manager, which results in outright or majority control of the investee company (portfolio 
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company). The time between investment and exit is known as the holding period (HP). During the 
holding period, the fund manager seeks to increase the value of the investee company.  
We discern between three types of fund managers: keiretsu funds, Japanese independent 
funds, and foreign funds. Keiretsu funds are affiliated to large institutions from the inner circle of 
Japanese big business, such as banks, insurance companies, institutional asset managers, or large 
general trading houses. Independent fund managers are not affiliated to any institution and are 
typically owned by management. In our data, there are 35 dependent, 28 independent, and 21 
foreign fund managers. Out of the 21 foreign fund managers, 18 are headquartered in the United 
States or the United Kingdom. 
Buyout is used as an umbrella term for four transaction types: business succession, 
divestment, management support (MBO), and turnaround. These four types of buyout may be 
applied to either a privately held business or a publicly listed business. The latter are referred to as 
“take-private transactions” (TP), in which a buyout firm or a consortium thereof acquire the stock 
of a publicly traded company and then delist the acquired firm.  
Investments can be exited either via an Initial Public Offering (IPO), through a trade sale, 
i.e., selling the portfolio company to another firm, or by selling it to another buyout firm. The 
acquisition of a business from another buyout fund is called a secondary buyout deal, or simply 
“secondary”. In our dataset, this also includes tertiary investments. 
Operationalization 
In Japan, buyout investing represents a distinct Western business model that stands in stark 
contrast to the so-called Japanese model, which values the interests of stakeholders (especially 
employees) over those of shareholders, co-operation rather than competition, and long-term 
orientation rather than short-term maximization (Katzner 2008). This orientation is reportedly one 
reason for the reluctance of potential buyout targets to associate with a buyout fund in general, and 
with a foreign fund in particular. Deal sourcing has frequently been mentioned as the biggest 
challenge for foreign buyout fund managers, and to a lesser degree for Japanese fund managers as 
well (The Economist 2010). Accordingly, reputation matters for deal origination (Ljungqvist, 
Richardson, and Wolfenzon 2008; Haynes 2009). The vast majority of foreign funds active in 
Japan hail from Anglo-Saxon economies, chiefly the US and the UK. The ensuing homogeneity 
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among the “visitors” in our data is instrumental to discerning the cultural dynamics conceptualized 
in our model. 
Recalling our earlier probabilistic argument that Hofstede’s dimensions of culture correctly 
report the sign of differences for very large distances of his measures, we select the two 
dimensions with the largest distances between the Japanese and Anglo-Saxon societies, which are 
uncertainty avoidance (UA; index values of 92 for Japan vs. 46 for the US) and long-term 
orientation (LTO; 88:26). UA refers to the tendency of agents to avoid situations of uncertainty, 
quite in the Knightian sense of uncertainty as risk under unknown probabilities. In the buyout 
investment business, turnaround deals represent ultimate uncertainty. Accordingly, we expect 
Anglo-Saxon visitors to display stronger original preferences for turnaround deals.  
In turn, the high index score on Hofstede’s LTO dimension in Japanese society reflects a 
general preference for long-term stable situations. In this cultural environment, ownership by a 
buyout fund represents merely a transitory state on the road to becoming part of a larger group – 
as the fund eventually exits the business to a strategic investor, or to becoming fully independent 
through an IPO. As this transitory state is typically characterized by uncertainty, the high level of 
uncertainty avoidance in Japanese individuals suggests domestic preferences for shorter holding 
periods. In contrast, such considerations do not arise in the case of Anglo-Saxon investors. 
Abstracting from any negative spillovers on reputation, pure profit maximization may even 
suggest extending holding periods beyond the time necessary for restructuring as long as the 
expected exit prices increase at a higher rate than opportunity cost.  
Initial values and hypotheses 
Let us consider an Anglo-Saxon buyout fund competing for a deal with domestic players in Japan. 
Its chances of successful deal sourcing depend on bid price, associated stereotype, and reputation 
based on the fund’s history of revealed preferences. In terms of stereotype – or country reputation 
– the Japanese parties will perceive Anglo-Saxon funds as having the antithesis of Japanese 
business values. Thus, the assessment of foreign investors is reduced to the corresponding 
stereotype in early transactions (compare equation 5). In line with prediction 1, we thus expect 
foreign fund managers to adapt to local norms in order to improve their deal-sourcing capabilities. 
In the case under scrutiny in this paper such learning through observation suggests: 
Hypothesis 1: Share of turnaround deals and duration of holding periods by Anglo-Saxon 
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investors relative to domestic agents decreases with τ as the number of 
transactions observed in the market.  
 
With 95 of 545 transactions (17.4 %) in our data set won by visitors, we argue that condition τv/τd 
>> 0 is met. Building on prediction 2 this suggests: 
Hypothesis 2: Share of turnaround deals and duration of holding period of transactions by 
domestic investors decrease over time. 
Prediction 3 argues that the extent of stereotype S and its weight α in determining reputation can 
only be inferred by learning from peer transactions τp, whereas insights into the relevance of 
reputation k in the utility function of domestic sellers can equally well be gained from transactions 
involving visitor and domestic buyers, hence from total market activity τm. This suggests: 
Hypothesis 3: Learning from observing peer transactions τp leads to faster assimilation 
than observing total market activity τm. 
 
Finally, building on (8), prediction 4 suggests “defecting” in ultimate transactions: 
Hypothesis 4: In ultimate deals by Anglo-Saxon investors, turnaround deals turn more 
likely and duration of holding periods becomes longer.  
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
In order to obtain the subset relevant to our assessment of the “visitors to Rome” effect, we 
exclude 16 investments by non-Anglo-Saxon funds from the population of 545 deals. As 
calculating our test statistic for uncertainty avoidance further depends on the availability of data 
on the transaction type, we need to exclude another 23 transactions due to missing data, thus 
yielding a net of nUA = 506 (or 92.8% of the population). 
In turn, our test statistic for LTO depends on data on the duration of holding periods, so we 
can only include investments already concluded, i.e., exited from the portfolio of the acquiring 
fund. The population of investments exited by 30 September 2015 consists of 415 transactions. 
Excluding 11 cases of investments with unknown entry years and nine investments by non-Anglo-
Saxon foreign funds yields a gross sample size of 395 cases. As the complexity of a transaction 
increases with the size of the investee company, we use the log of deal value as control variable. 
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Owing to missing data, this reduces sample size by 47 cases. The data also still includes 15 so-
called “flip deals” of less than one year, in which a buyout fund merely acts as a business broker. 
As the holding periods of these deals are by their very nature short, irrespective of the efforts of 
fund managers, they do not contribute to reputation building. Consequently, the effective sample 
size is reduced to nLTO = 333 (or 80.2% of the population). Table I documents descriptive statistics 
for the two samples. 
Table I: Descriptive Statistics 
Numerical variables  Mean SD Median Min Max 
Sample UA (n = 506)       
Transactions observed (entries) τ  146.75 137.78 108.5 0 532 
       
Sample LTO (n = 333)       
Transactions observed (exits) τ  51.60 64.59 19.0 0 273 
Size (transaction value; 100 million JPY) 149.51 436.06 35.0 1 4152 
       
 
Categorical variables  
(Frequency) Sample UA (n = 506) Sample LTO (n = 333) 
Fund type Keiretsu Independent Anglo-Saxon  Keiretsu Independent Anglo-Saxon 
- Keiretsu fund 244    171   
- Independent  183    115  
- Anglo-Saxon    79    47 
First deal 32 28 18  27 23 16 
Ultimate deal 18 13 8  18 11 8 
Market exit 57 35 20  54 29 20 
 
Results 
Our test statistic for the first reputational dimension is the dichotomous variable of the 
“turnaround” deal type versus other deal types, indicating the use of logit regression. Given the 
low value of uncertainty avoidance in Anglo-Saxon cultures, we expect the parameter estimate of 
the corresponding dummy to load with a positive sign, indicating a c.p. higher share of turnaround 
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deals for Anglo-Saxon investors. In terms of independent variables causing increases in relevant 
items of knowledge vector κ (14) we use the number of acquisitions τ concluded since a fund’s 
market entry. This measures the gaining of experience through observation by individual funds. 
To model the marginal returns to learning postulated in (14), we use square roots of the number of 
observations, i.e., ϕ = 0.5. We further distinguish transactions won by any market participant τm 
from transactions won by peers τp. Finally, we test for shirking in ultimate transactions, by 
introducing a corresponding dummy.  
Independent of any differences in culture, a buyout fund’s capacity to successfully 
complete a transaction from investment to exit is crucial for proving operational abilities in a 
newly entered market. Hence, we may expect funds to be hesitant to incur the risk of a failed 
turnaround deal in their first transaction. We control for this effect by introducing and interacting a 
corresponding first-deal dummy. We introduce a further dummy for Japanese independent funds 
(non-keiretsu). Consequently, keiretsu buyout funds, which account for the majority of 
transactions, become the reference category.  
Testing Hypothesis 1 (“visitors to Rome” effect) and Hypothesis 2 (endogeneity of 
revealed domestic preferences) requires different set-ups. In the former case, we include fixed 
effects for the years 2000 through 2015 (making 1998 and 1999 the base category). This standard 
precaution against unobserved variables, however, precludes the evidencing of endogeneity in 
domestic transactions because any general trend will be leveled out. Therefore, we add a second 
set-up without year-fixed effects. Hypothesis 4 (shirking) can be tested in both set-ups. Table II 
documents regression output labeled according to hypotheses tested.  
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Table II 
Estimation Output for Turnaround Deals (Odds) 
Variable Logit-Estimate (SE) 
 (1) (1-4) (2) (2-4) 
Intercept -1.6566   
(0.8572) 
-1.7216   
(0.8640) 
-0.7916   
(0.3149) 
-0.7875   
(0.3156) 
Anglo-Saxon 
(Dummy)  
2.0995   
(1.0141) 
2.2563 
(1.0475) 
2.2140   
(0.9987) 
2.3176   
(0.9987) 
Observation of market transactions τm  
(Number of deals observed since entry^.5) 
-0.0224   
(0.0324) 
-0.0214   
(0.0328) 
-0.0553 
(0.0238) 
-0.0555 
(0.0238) 
First deal  
(Dummy) 
0.1562   
(0.4534) 
0.2261   
(0.4742) 
0.1033   
(0.4031) 
-0.0756   
(0.4296) 
Ultimate deal 
(Dummy) 
 -0.1592   
(0.4988) 
 -0.0872   
(0.4698) 
Interactions with Anglo-Saxon     
Observation -0.2321   
(0.1101) 
-0.2456   
(0.1144) 
-0.2430   
(0.1062) 
-0.2516   
(0.1077) 
First entry -1.5247   
(1.1523)* 
-1.4802   
(1.1837) 
-1.7710 
(1.1378)* 
-1.7132 
(1.1477)* 
Ultimate deal  -0.7791 
(1.1241) 
 -0.6632 
(1.0902) 
Controls     
Non-keiretsu 
(Dummy) 
0.4927 
(0.2393) 
0.4956   
(0.2396) 
0.4171   
(0.2305) 
0.4162   
(0.2306) 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes No No 
p of total model** .0003 .0005 .0001 .0003 
Notes:  * 90% one-sided CI; **(1-chisquare(Δdeviance, Δdf)) 
Estimates for Anglo-Saxon and non-keiretsu funds are significant for all scenarios in both set-ups, 
and coefficients confirm our assumptions pertaining to initial values: Anglo-Saxon funds are much 
more likely to invest in a turnaround transaction, and domestic funds not linked to a keiretsu are 
about 50 to 60% more likely to do so. These differences level out as visitors accumulate 
experience: interaction effects on learning from observation produce significant estimates for 
learning parameter β1 (compare equation 14) for all scenarios in both set-ups. When fixed effects 
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are removed from the second set-up, main (domestic) effects turn significant. In relative terms, the 
interaction effect (visitors) is about four times stronger than the main effect (domestic). Taken 
together, these results provide solid evidence supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2. As the learning of 
visitors continues, the odds of Anglo-Saxon investors are reaching par with independent domestic 
funds after observing about 50 to 60 market transactions and with keiretsu funds after about 80 
transactions. Thus, with an average of 30 transactions per year, over-compensation becomes a 
reality for many visitors after just two to three years in the market.  
In order to test Hypothesis 3 pertaining to the additional information on the extent of 
stereotype S and its weight α in determining reputation – which visitors may draw from the 
observation of peer transactions – we cannot test both variables (peer versus market transactions) 
simultaneously due to obvious concerns about multi-collinearity.1 Instead, we replace main and 
interaction effects with separate z-normalized variables and re-run regressions 1-4 and 2-4 based 
on peer and market observations of visitors. Having done so, however, we find parameter 
estimates β2 for learning from peers indistinguishable from those relating to market observation β1. 
The dummy for ultimate deals introduced for evidencing defecting agents (Hypothesis 4) 
did not produce any significant estimates in this first behavioral dimension. In contrast, the 
dummy controls for Japanese independent funds (non-keiretsu) were significant in all set-ups and 
scenarios. Similarly, interactions for the first-deal dummy were significantly different from zero in 
three of the four regressions (1, 2, and 2-4), and very to close to significant in set-up 1-4.  
 
For our second test statistic, length of holding period, we are able to use ordinary least 
squares. As learning about the holding period can only be drawn from investments already exited, 
the number of transactions available for observation takes the exit date as reference. While we 
generally use the same regression set-ups as before, devising year-fixed effects requires particular 
care. In concrete terms, transactions with early exits or late entries during the observation period 
will naturally be biased toward shorter holding periods. To account for this, we base fixed effects 
on exit years for the first part of the sample (until 2005) and on entry years for the latter part (from 
2006). For the same reason set-up 2 cannot completely dispense with fixed effects. As a 
compromise, we retain fixed effects for exits until 2005, and for entries from 2010. This suffices 
to capture about 90% of biased cases and – for distributional properties – an even larger share of 
                                                
1  Peer transactions are a strict subset of market transactions and highly correlated.  
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total bias resulting from early exits and late entries.2 
We add further controls for independent Japanese funds (non-keiretsu, as before) and for 
the secondary deal type. The latter reflects our assumption that previous buyout investors will 
already have realized most available quick wins. Finally, we include a first-deal dummy in order 
to separate the intention to prove full operability (by quickly exiting one’s first deal) from efforts 
at assimilation. Table III documents regression output. 
                                                
2  The share of deals with a holding period exceeding five years is 27.3% in the entire sample, and 29.0% in a reduced 
sample with entries up to 2005. Applying this latter – more conservative figure to the 37.4% of deals exited between 
the early exit and late entry brackets, we understand that the remaining year-fixed effects still cover 89.2% of biased 
cases.  
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Table III 
Estimation Output for Length of Holding Period (Days) 
Variable OLS Estimate (SE) 
 (1) (1-4) (2) (2-4) 
Intercept 1402.47 
(197.79) 
1397.58 
(197.69) 
1232.35 
(166.69) 
1275.05    
(166.32) 
Anglo-Saxon 
(Dummy) 
994.30 
(273.28) 
913.72    
(278.04) 
929.73 
(27464) 
848.82    
(277.25) 
Observation of market transactions τm 
(Number of deals observed since entry^.5) 
22.85 
(19.00) 
12.76     
(19.79) 
-10.98 
(15.13) 
-16.67     
(15.19) 
First deal 
(Dummy) 
69.37 
(165.27) 
59.98    
(165.51) 
-105.84 
(156.23) 
-72.90    
(156.82) 
Ultimate deal 
(Dummy) 
 -248.17 
(166.29)* 
 -361.41 
(159.71) 
Interactions with Anglo-Saxon     
Observation -99.00 
(32.89) 
-99.06     
(32.85) 
-95.57 
(32.98) 
-97.34     
(32.79) 
First  -597.60 
(340.75) 
-666.15    
(342.03) 
-542.55 
 (343.11)* 
-651.29    
(343.22) 
Ultimate deal 
 
 598.51 
(350.18) 
 768.11    
(342.97) 
Controls     
Non-keiretsu 
(Dummy) 
150.84 
(90.49) 
149.85     
(90.30) 
135.25 
(91.04)* 
136.64     
(90.39)* 
Size  
(log of transaction value) 
37.56 
(28.85)* 
45.41 
(29.10)* 
53.89 
(28.36) 
61.04     
(28.30) 
Secondary deal type  
(Dummy) 
315.51 
(159.87) 
339.21    
(160.06) 
255.05 
   (158.66)* 
305.36    
(158.73) 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Partial Partial 
Adjusted R2 0.1153 0.1191 0.0985 0.1114 
Notes:  * 90% one-sided CI 
The visitor dummy is significant for all four regressions, and coefficients confirm our assumptions 
pertaining to initial values: Anglo-Saxon investors initially pay little attention to the local 
preference for minimizing time in conditions of uncertainty (i.e., under fund ownership) before a 
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long-term solution (strategic investor or IPO) can be found. The corresponding estimates indicate 
that holding periods are almost three years longer than the reference category of keiretsu funds, 
and about two years longer than independent Japanese funds (non-keiretsu). As visitors start to 
accumulate learning, holding periods become shorter: the interaction effect estimating β1 from 
equation 14 is significant for all four models. Parameter estimates suggest that visitors reach par 
with independent funds after observing about 70 transactions and with keiretsu funds after about 
100 transactions. Accordingly, many visitors assimilate beyond domestic standards in their third to 
fourth year in the market.  
In the second set-up which reduces fixed effects to a necessary minimum, the main 
(domestic) effects of learning from observation load with the expected signs, but are not 
significant. However, taking into consideration the similar value of estimates for regressions 2 and 
2-4, the relatively small standard errors, and the size proportion of interaction to main effect of 
about 5:1, we argue that this adds further indicative evidence in support of Hypothesis 2.  
Using the same approach as before for testing an additional learning effect pertaining to 
stereotype S and its weight α in determining visitor reputation (Hypothesis 3), we re-run models 1-
4 and 2-4, replacing the interaction effect with normalized variables. As it turns out, parameter 
estimates β2 for peer-based learning of visitors are about 60 to 65% larger than estimates β1 for 
market-based observations. While there is miniscule overlap between one-sided 90% confidence 
intervals, no overlap remains if confidence levels are reduced to 85% (1-4) and 89% (2-4), 
respectively.  
Estimates of the dummy for ultimate deals produced significant estimates in both set-ups, 
providing solid evidence on visitor shirking (Hypothesis 4). The main (domestic) effects for 
ultimate deals also produced significant estimates in both set-ups (1-4 and 2-4). Interestingly, 
however, the sign is opposite to the interaction. 
The secondary deal type proves a valid control, with estimates indicating that holding 
periods last about 8 to 12 months longer for this type. Similarly, controlling for size as 
approximated in terms of value produces significant estimates with the average holding period 
increasing between one and two months for every tenfold increase in deal value. Finally, the 
control for initial efforts aimed at proving full operability (by swiftly exiting the first deal) 
produced significant estimates in all regressions, with the holding period of the first transactions 
of Anglo-Saxon funds shorter by about 18 to 22 months.  
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4. Discussion 
Our findings add further evidence to earlier findings of culture-specific preferences resulting in 
differential outcomes. Our estimates for the visitor dummy document level differences in line with 
predictions derived from cultural studies: Anglo-Saxon investors initially display a lower degree 
of uncertainty avoidance than their domestic counterparts, and less – if any – respect for the 
domestic preference for stable long-term solutions. Over time, however, Anglo-Saxon investors 
engage in significant assimilation efforts. Rather than merely assimilating, Anglo-Saxon visitors 
to Japan exceed domestic standards,  an over-compensation that suggests that negative stereotypes 
are substantial and sticky. Put into perspective, our findings provide robust evidence on the 
“visitors to Rome” effect modeled in section 2.  
Existing theoretical work suggests that full assimilation should be sufficient to compensate 
for statistical discrimination. Accordingly, over-compensation as found in our data may indicate 
taste-based discrimination. As Schwab (1986) rightly noted, such taste-based discrimination 
cannot be characterized as either efficient or inefficient, if one accepts that taste informs utility. In 
a more recent interpretation, compensation efforts beyond statistical differences may be necessary 
to balance the identity externalities suffered by domestic agents (Akerlof and Kranton 2000: 740). 
However, in light of the extension suggested to our model, namely that reputation may accrue 
from the transaction history of visitors, over-compensation may also represent an attempt at 
balancing earlier non-assimilated behavior. From this inter-temporal perspective, the observed 
over-compensation may have resulted exclusively from statistical discrimination, provided that 
domestic sellers do not recognize assimilation tendencies in visitors.  
 
Abstracting from a potential influence through unobserved variables, we also find evidence 
that domestic buyout funds are reacting to the assimilation efforts of visitors by enhancing their 
own initial positioning, albeit at a slower pace than visitor assimilation. In essence, this means that 
a sufficiently large group of visitors may cause domestic revealed preferences to become 
endogenous (strategic) in line with our second hypothesis. In a market with a reportedly limited, 
hence close to inelastic, supply this causes a marked increase in the equilibrium “virtue level” of 
revealed preferences. 
 
With regard to the additional learning potential on the extent of stereotyping α as available 
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from the observation of peer transactions (Hypothesis 3), visitors have apparently not tapped that 
potential in the first behavioral dimension (odds of a turnaround deal). In contrast, we found close-
to-significant evidence of visitors having drawn increased awareness on stereotyping from their 
observation of peers in the second dimension (length of holding period). These differential 
findings for the two dimensions may be related to the fact that observing the transactions of others 
is only one source of information, and arguably of less significance than information to be drawn 
from visitor participation in bids. In the face-to-face meetings that form part of any bid, domestic 
sellers are far more likely to openly and directly address the risk-seeking stereotype of Anglo-
Saxon visitors (in terms of their involvement in turnaround deals) than visitor perceived disregard 
of employee preferences (for minimal time under uncertainty). As these hints on risk-related 
stereotyping from participation in bids are accessible regardless of whether a domestic player or a 
fellow visitor eventually wins a deal, ex-post observation of peers will likely produce little if any 
additional information on stereotyping. 
If efforts at assimilation are genuinely strategic, i.e., if original preferences of both visitors 
and domestic agents remain unchanged, our model suggests that revealed preferences in ultimate 
deals should revert to original preferences (Hypothesis 4). In our data, we did not find evidence of  
“shirking” in the first behavioral dimension (share of turnaround transactions), but solid evidence 
was found in the second dimension (length of holding period). This is not entirely surprising. If 
revealed preferences are indeed strategic, shirking requires a prior decision to exit the market. As 
early as at the time of investment, however, many agents arguably do not know that the deal may 
ultimately become their last one, with that decision only being taken at some point in time during 
the holding period. Accordingly, evidence of shirking on the holding period is far more likely to 
be seen than for the odds of a turnaround deal.  
Interestingly, we found inverse (negative) signs in significant parameter estimates for the 
main (domestic) effect of ultimate deals on the holding period in both set-ups (1-4 and 2-4). At 
first sight, this seems counter-intuitive as one would expect domestic players to equally revert to 
their original preferences, i.e., holding periods of ultimate domestic transactions should increase 
back to the levels seen before domestic agents eventually started to react to visitor behavior. One 
possible clue to this phenomenon may be drawn from the fact that to visitors, “ultimate deal” 
means market exit, whereas in many cases it only means strategic change to domestic players. 
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Keiretsu funds, in particular, have an obvious incentive not to jeopardize their group’s overall 
reputation by smoothly and swiftly folding up a business that they are leaving. 
 
Robustness 
There are two potential objections to the validity of our findings. First, visitor funds may be self-
selecting according to the fit of their preferences with domestic standards. In concrete terms, if 
visitor funds with the largest differences from domestic preferences decide to exit the market, the 
remaining group of agents will naturally become more similar to domestic players. Eventually, 
eight of 18 Anglo-Saxon buyout funds (and 31 of 60 domestic funds) withdraw from the market 
during our observation period. To test whether their withdrawals were caused by a slow or absent 
assimilation process according to Figure I, we introduced and interacted a market exit dummy 
marking these funds (and replacing the ultimate entry dummy in set-ups 1-4 and 2-4 for both 
behavioral dimensions). This procedure, however, did not produce significant parameter estimates 
in any of the corresponding regressions, suggesting that market withdrawal was motivated by 
factors external to the model. Most importantly, however, this also suggests that the assimilation 
tendencies observed are not the result of a selection effect caused by non-assimilating funds 
withdrawing from the market. Pertaining to the funds remaining in the market, the limited number 
of transactions per fund precludes statistical testing for the lock-in effect noted in FIGURE 1. Given 
the considerable assimilation efforts being made by visitors, however, we doubt that a substantial 
share of funds was subject to this effect. 
 
A second potential objection is the possibility that unobserved variables are causing the 
assimilation tendencies in both behavioral dimensions documented. As regards the shortening of 
holding periods, one may argue that this happens simply because funds eventually learn how to 
create value at investee companies more swiftly. This would indeed imply that holding periods are 
not becoming shorter for the purpose of reputation building. In turn, the share of turnaround deals 
may be high in early transactions, simply because the sellers of distressed or insolvent businesses 
may care little (creditors), or not at all (courts) about the reputation of potential acquirers.  
A first counter-argument against these latter two objections can be derived from the 
differential between the slopes of behavioral adaptation of visitor versus domestic agents as 
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documented in our data. If incentives for learning were equal for visitors and natives, one would 
expect natives to be learning faster than visitors, given their information advantage in terms of 
explicit and tacit knowledge. Our data, however, documents the opposite: visitor behavior changes 
much faster than native behavior. Taking this line of thought one step further, we argue that this 
differential will only arise if visitors have a substantial additional incentive for learning. And a 
very likely incentive is the perceived need to overcome stereotype. 
Whereas this first counter-argument relies on (albeit realistic) conjectures, a second 
counter-argument directly builds on evidence from our analysis. We have argued that buyout 
funds entering a new market have an incentive to quickly prove their full operability by 
successfully bringing a first deal to conclusion (exit) regardless of potential culture-specific 
differences in preferences. Our empirical analysis has confirmed this assumption as we have 
documented that new entrants show a significant tendency to avoid risky turnaround situations in 
their initial deals and to exit their first deals more swiftly. This evidences that visitor agents are 
actually able to swiftly complete a deal, and to successfully acquire healthy businesses as early as 
on their very first deal. However, as they eventually reach their objective of proving operability, a 
willingness to use these abilities then only arises anew as they start to learn about the extent of the 
stereotyping they are facing. 
5. Conclusion 
This research has conceptualized the “visitors to Rome” effect as a tendency of foreign entrants to 
emulate domestic behavior in market transactions. Our model has shown that stereotypes imply an 
incentive to assimilation efforts if the reputation of the other party is an argument in the utility 
function of domestic agents. The model further shows that over-compensation is possible if 
assimilation efforts are not overly costly, and that it becomes more likely if stereotypes are sticky. 
Thus, our research adds conceptual bones to the many accounts of the need for localization 
documented in the management literature.  
Putting model predictions to the test, our empirical analysis documents how visitor agents 
learn to build their reputation through strategically revealed preferences. Using two behavioral 
dimensions with substantial differences in initial values, our analysis has documented how Anglo-
Saxon buyout funds in Japan have learned to avoid risky deals and to work on reducing time under 
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uncertainty for their investee companies in an attempt to counter negative stereotype. In line with 
game-theoretic reasoning, we also found evidence of agents reverting to their original preferences 
in ultimate transactions, which implies that visitor behavior is indeed strategic.  
Our data does not enable inferences as to the premiums paid by visitors to compensate for 
stereotype. Nevertheless, the substantial and sustained assimilation efforts – with many funds even 
over-assimilating – suggest two conclusions. First, the initial premiums were considerable enough 
to trigger a decision to invest in reputation building. Second, the fact that funds sustain their 
efforts at reputation building implies that efforts are paying off in terms of the premiums asked of 
visitors decreasing.  
 
Methodologically, our research documents that cultural dimensions in the preference 
structure of agents may indeed be used to track the dynamics ensuing from interactions between 
heterogeneous agents. We believe that to achieve this, meeting two conditions was critical. First, 
we selected for investigation an agent pair with very large distances (Japanese vs. Anglo-Saxon), 
which maximizes the likelihood of significant differences. Second, we linked the cultural 
dimensions to variables quantifiable from financial data. We are inclined to believe that meeting 
these two conditions will be important in enabling future research on the interaction dynamics 
between agents with different cultural backgrounds. 
 
The agenda for further investigations of these kinds of interaction dynamics remains 
substantial. For instance, our prediction that visitor success in early transactions is markedly 
different from domestic success remains to be tested. Equally, future research may try to inquire 
the “price of ignorance” in terms of premiums paid to compensate for stereotype and insufficient 
effort. Finally, the model proposed and the extensions discussed in this research only represent a 
first attempt to conceptualize the “visitors to Rome” effect. We are looking forward to seeing the 
model evolve as other scholars join the debate. 
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Appendix A.1: 1st Order Derivatives to (10) 
Defining the right part of (10) as a function g(c,k,α) we obtain the following partial derivatives: 
 
 
 
 
gk > 0 holds as 1 – k – k Log(c/k) > 0 for c, k ∈ [0,1]. In turn, with k – 1 < 0 and all other elements 
positive, the signs of gα and gc  are negative.  
 
 
 
